For many years I have expended a fair amount of time thinking about foreign policy.  Some of that is a function of my military service.  Having served in Germany for seven years, I learned a lot about other people, their customs, views, and values, especially living with German families.  That also provided an opportunity to travel to many other European countries.  In doing so I learned not only how Europe regards the United States, but also how my own perception of the US changed when seen from another vantage point.

I had similar revelations when assigned to the Republic of Korea (South Korea) for over three years and in the Middle East where I served as a military peacekeeper and later in combat.  It was there that my views of US foreign policy were sharpened through my personal experience in Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.  

While I was commissioned as a Field Artillery officer, the Army sent me to graduate school to study comparative governments of the Middle East and Soviet foreign policy.  It was a very good fit for the late 1970s and early 1980s.  The Middle East was—as it is today—in much turmoil and the former Soviet Union—Russia—was busy trying to expand its influence in that region of the world over that of the US.  

Understanding that influence was a major focus in my graduate studies.  I owe much today to my University of Virginia professors who helped me peel back the layers of misunderstanding that Americans have in grasping foreign policy.  As a young soldier, I looked at the world from a military perspective not paying much attention to the complexity of conflict in various regions.  In the course of my studies, I learned that if the US sought to resolve conflict in our national interest, then we need to not only understand the stratified and complex nature of regional conflicts, but also how to influence them.

One of my professors, Charles G. MacDonald, introduced me to a term, the intolerance of ambiguity, which has been very helpful in understanding the nature of conflict.  The idea behind this term was that people tend to be intolerant—frustrated—with the ambiguous nature of conflict that may not be readily apparent to people trying to grasp the particulars of regional relationships.  We see this frequently among American politicians and opinionmakers who try to reduce a conflict to a simplistic level.  “If only the Jews and the Arabs would stop fighting, the Middle East could find peace.”  Nothing could be further from the truth.  The conflicts that exist in the Middle East are layered with complications.  This is particularly true in individual countries where not only religion-on-religion conflict is present, but also between factions within religious groups.  And of course, there is the tension between military and civilian culture, free enterprise and government authoritarianism, upper and lower classes, educated and uneducated populations, and the empowered and the oppressed of society.  If you were to solve the Arab-Israeli crisis in a single act tomorrow, you would still witness the stratified nature of conflict in every country in the Middle East.  It can’t be reduced to simplicity.  And the intolerance of ambiguity does not help.  So, what is the point?  The US must take time to comprehend the nature of conflicts if we are to have a positive influence over them toward peace, or in reducing tension that can lead to wars.    

Another professor, Dr. Alvin Z. Rubinstein and a brilliant Middle East scholar, encouraged me to carefully examine the nature of influence in resolving conflict.  He made the point that all too frequently people toss the word “influence” around as a superficial concept.  Country “X” has influence over country “Y,” therefore “Y” will comply with “X’s” demands.  In reality, it is never quite that simple.  If it were, who could possibly resist the demands of the US in the world today?  Answer: many do.  So, if we are to influence other nations, say towards peace, then we need to carefully evaluate where we have influence in particular areas and employ it strategically.  Our influence includes the domains of diplomacy, information, military, and economics that we can apply to motivate others.  As the saying goes, if the only tool you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.  But we have more than one tool and those can be applied effectively when we closely consider how to improve a situation.

This’s very true in Syria today. Unless we understand the nature of conflict there beyond what we see on cable news, then we won’t appreciate the assortment of tools we should use to solve problems to achieve outcomes consistent with our national interests.  

That means comprehending conflict and influence, especially in Syria.

Categories: CBW

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